Veto Message

Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995

The document

As published in the Compilation of Presidential Documents, with the source's own line breaks.

Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995

August 11, 1995

To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning herewith without my approval S. 21, the ``Bosnia and
Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.'' I share the Congress'
frustration with the situation in Bosnia and am also appalled by the
human suffering that is occurring there. I am keenly aware that Members
of Congress are deeply torn about what should be done to try to bring
this terrible conflict to an end. My Administration will continue to do
its utmost with our allies to guide developments toward a comprehensive
political settlement acceptable to all the parties. S. 21, however,
would hinder rather than support those efforts. It would, quite simply,
undermine the chances for peace in Bosnia, lead to a wider war, and
undercut the authority of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to
impose effective measures to deal with threats to the peace. It would
also attempt to regulate by statute matters for which the President is
responsible under the Constitution.
S. 21 is designed to lead to the unilateral lifting by the United
States of the international arms embargo imposed on the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the United States has supported the
lifting of the embargo by action of the U.N. Security Council, I
nonetheless am firmly convinced that a unilateral lifting of the embargo
would be a serious mistake. It would undermine renewed efforts to
achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an
escalation of the conflict there, including the almost certain
Americanization of the conflict.
The allies of the United States in the U.N. Protection Force for
Bosnia (UNPROFOR) have made it clear that a unilateral lifting of the
arms embargo by the United States would result in their rapid withdrawal
from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. The United States, as the leader
of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in
that withdrawal, thereby putting thousands of U.S. troops at risk. At
the least, such unilateral action by the United States would drive our
allies out of Bosnia and involve the United States more deeply, while
making the conflict much more dangerous.
The consequences of UNPROFOR's departure because of a unilateral
lifting of the arms embargo must be faced squarely. First, the United
States would immediately be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw
UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, the fighting in
Bosnia would intensify. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by
waiting while the Bosnian government received new arms and training.
Third, under assault, the Bosnian government would look to the United
States to provide arms and air support, and, if that failed, more active
military support. Unilateral lift of the embargo would lead to
unilateral American responsibility. Fourth, intensified fighting would
risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for
regional peace. UNPROFOR's withdrawal would set back fresh prospects for
a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future. Finally,
unilateral U.S. action under these circumstances would create serious
divisions between the United States and its key allies, with potential
long-lasting damage to these important relationships and to NATO.
S. 21 would undermine the progress we have made with our allies and
the United Nations in recent weeks to strengthen the protection of the
safe areas in Bosnia and improve the provision of humanitarian
assistance. NATO has agreed to the substantial and decisive use of air
power to protect Gorazde, Sarajevo, and the other safe areas. The U.N.
Secretary General has delegated

his authority to the military commanders on the ground to approve the
use of air power. The British and French, with our support, are
deploying a Rapid Reaction Force to help open land routes to Sarajevo
for convoys carrying vital supplies, strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to
carry out its mission. These measures will help provide a prompt and
effective response to Serb attacks on the safe areas. This new
protection would disappear if UNPROFOR withdraws in response to the
unilateral lifting of the embargo.
Events over the past several weeks have also created some new
opportunities to seek a negotiated peace. We are actively engaged in
discussions with our allies and others on these prospects. Unilaterally
lifting the arms embargo now would jeopardize these ongoing efforts.
Unilaterally disregarding the U.N. Security Council's decision to
impose an arms embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia also would have
a detrimental effect on the ability of the Security Council to act
effectively in crisis situations, such as the trade and weapons
embargoes against Iraq or Serbia. If we decide for ourselves to violate
the arms embargo, other states would cite our action as a pretext to
ignore other Security Council decisions when it suits their interests.
S. 21 also would direct that the executive branch take specific
actions in the Security Council and, if unsuccessful there, in the
General Assembly. There is no justification for bringing the issue
before the General Assembly, which has no authority to reconsider and
reverse decisions of the Security Council, and it could be highly
damaging to vital U.S. interests to imply otherwise. If the General
Assembly could exercise such binding authority without the protection of
the veto right held in the Security Council, any number of issues could
be resolved against the interests of the United States and our allies.
Finally, the requirements of S. 21 would impermissibly intrude on
the core constitutional responsibilities of the President for the
conduct of foreign affairs, and would compromise the ability of the
President to protect vital U.S. national security interests abroad. It
purports, unconstitutionally, to instruct the President on the content
and timing of U.S. diplomatic positions before international bodies, in
derogation of the President's exclusive constitutional authority to
control such foreign policy matters. It also attempts to require the
President to approve the export of arms to a foreign country where a
conflict is in progress, even though this may well draw the United
States more deeply into that conflict. These encroachments on the
President's constitutional power over, and responsibility for, the
conduct of foreign affairs, are unacceptable.
Accordingly, I am disapproving S. 21 and returning it to the Senate.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
August 11, 1995.

Legislation named

Bills this document refers to, on the congressional side of the record.

Bill Title
S. 21 (104th) โ€”

Veto record

This document is the message returning a bill to Congress.

Bill Override Vetoed
S. 21 Not attempted August 11, 1995

Sources

Every figure and line above comes from these; they open at the publisher.

Record cpd-wcpd-1995-08-21-pg1439, held as published by the GovInfo. LegiList reproduces the text and does not edit it.