Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products Into The United States

Proclamation 11001 of January 14, 2026

Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals
and Their Derivative Products Into The United States

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

1. On October 24, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce
(Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his
investigation into the effects of imports of processed
critical minerals and their derivative products
(PCMDPs) on the national security of the United States
under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862 (section 232). Based on the
facts considered in that investigation, which took into
account the close relation of the economic welfare of
the Nation to our national security and other relevant
factors, see 19 U.S.C. 1862(d), the Secretary found and
advised me of his opinion that PCMDPs are being
imported into the United States in such quantities and
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security of the United States.

2. The Secretary found that PCMDPs are essential to the
national security of the United States. PCMDPs are
indispensable to almost every industry, including
national defense programs and critical infrastructure.
PCMDPs are embedded across defense and commercial
supply chains and play an essential role in the
production of advanced weapons systems, energy
infrastructure, and everyday consumer goods. For
example, rare earth permanent magnets--a derivative
product of processed critical minerals--are used in and
vital to nearly all electronics and vehicles.

3. The Secretary found that PCMDPs are essential to the
United States' defense industrial base and the
technological superiority and operational readiness of
the military. PCMDPs are key components found
throughout the defense industrial base, contributing to
virtually all defense capabilities and activities. They
are essential for the development and sustainment of
high-performance military equipment, including fighter
aircraft, munitions, armor plating, naval ships,
communication networks, navigation systems, and
surveillance systems.

4. The Secretary also found that processed critical
minerals are essential to each of the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors identified by National Security
Memorandum 22 of April 30, 2024 (Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience). For example,
the chemical sector uses critical minerals, such as
lithium, fluorite, and bromine, for chemical synthesis
and industrial mechanisms. The communications sector
uses critical minerals, such as gallium, germanium,
indium, and yttrium, in fiber optic networks and
satellite systems. And the energy sector relies on
critical minerals, such as cobalt, nickel, uranium,
praseodymium, and terbium, for battery storage, nuclear
fuel, generators, and electric vehicle motors. The
Secretary determined that processed critical minerals
underpin critical military and economic applications.

5. The Secretary found that the United States is too
reliant on foreign sources of PCMDPs, lacks access to a
sufficiently secure and reliable supply chain to
PCMDPs, is experiencing unsustainable price volatility
with respect to critical mineral markets, and is
suffering from weakened domestic manufacturing and
production capacity of PCMDPs. The Secretary found that
these circumstances are a significant national security
vulnerability that

could be exploited by foreign actors; weaken the
industrial resilience of the United States; expose the
American people to supply chain disruptions, economic
instability, and strategic vulnerabilities; and
jeopardize the United States' ability to meet demands
for PCMDPs that are essential to its national defense
and critical infrastructure.

6. As of 2024, the United States was 100 percent net-
import reliant for 12 critical minerals, and 50 percent
or greater net-import reliant for a further 29 critical
minerals. Even where the United States has domestic
mining capacity, such as for cobalt, nickel, and rare
earth elements, the United States lacks the domestic
processing capacity to avoid downstream net-import
reliance. In fact, although the United States is the
second largest producer of mined, unprocessed rare
earth oxides in the world, the United States' limited
processing capacity still requires rare earth oxides to
be exported for further refining and processing before
being reimported for domestic use. As a result, the
United States is too entirely reliant on imports of
rare earth permanent magnets to meet commercial demand,
and United States production currently meets only a
fraction of defense needs. Mining a mineral
domestically does not safeguard the national security
of the United States if the United States remains
dependent on a foreign country for the processing of
that mineral.

7. In addition, the Secretary found that the United
States lacks access to a sufficiently secure and
reliable supply chain for PCMDPs. Even with respect to
the minerals for which the United States has only
partial import reliance, supply disruptions can still
expose important sectors--such as defense, aerospace,
telecommunications, and transportation--to serious
risk. For example, the limited capacity of the domestic
critical minerals industry, combined with foreign
dominance, has exposed the Department of War (DoW) to
significant supply chain risks. For several key
minerals, the vast majority of DoW supply chains rely
on at least one supplier from a single country,
underscoring the urgent need to diversify sources and
build resilient domestic capabilities.

8. The Secretary further found that critical mineral
markets are prone to price volatility. Price volatility
hinders private sector investment; limits market-based
economies' willingness to maintain capacity; leads to
facility closures; and threatens the long-term
viability of domestic mining, processing, and
downstream manufacturing capacity.

9. The Secretary also found that critical mineral
production in the United States has been declining. The
United States has experienced the closure or reduction
in size of facilities related to critical mineral
production, and some United States producers of
critical minerals have offshored their activities to
foreign countries.

10. The Secretary found that despite the decline in
refining, manufacturing, and production of critical
minerals in the United States, United States demand for
critical minerals is rapidly increasing and will
continue to increase. Contributing to the increased
United States demand are vital national security and
economic activities, including rising military threats
and growing high-tech industries, such as artificial
intelligence, data centers, nuclear energy, and new
energy technologies.

11. In the Secretary's opinion, it is imperative to the
national security to address these vulnerabilities. In
the Secretary's view, the United States must, among
other things, ensure that it has a secure supply chain
to obtain PCMDPs and that it has sufficient domestic
mining and processing of critical minerals to reduce
import reliance on foreign countries.

12. In light of these findings, the Secretary
recommended a range of actions, including actions to
adjust the imports of PCMDPs so that such imports will
not threaten to impair the national security. For
example, the Secretary recommended that I negotiate
agreements with foreign nations to ensure the United
States has adequate critical mineral supplies and to
mitigate the supply chain vulnerabilities as quickly as
possible. The Secretary also

suggested that it may be appropriate to impose import
restrictions, such as tariffs, if satisfactory
agreements are not reached in a timely manner.

13. After considering the Secretary's report, the
factors in section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and
other relevant factors and information, I concur with
the Secretary's finding that PCMDPs are being imported
into the United States in such quantities and under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security of the United States. In my judgment,
and in light of the Secretary's report, the factors in
section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant
factors and information, I determine that it is
necessary and appropriate to enter into negotiations
with trading partners to adjust the imports of PCMDPs
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the
national security of the United States. Depending on
the outcome of such negotiations, I may consider
alternative remedies in the future, including minimum
import prices for specific types of critical minerals.
I therefore direct the Secretary and the United States
Trade Representative (Trade Representative) to jointly
pursue negotiation of agreements or continue any
current negotiations of agreements, such as agreements
contemplated in section 232(c)(3)(A)(i) (19 U.S.C.
1862(c)(3)(A)(i)), to address the threatened impairment
of the national security with respect to PCMDPs.
Depending on the status or outcome of those
negotiations, I may take other measures to adjust the
imports of PCMDPs to address the threat to the national
security found in this proclamation.

14. Section 232 authorizes the President to adjust the
imports of an article and its derivatives that are
being imported into the United States in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security so that such imports
will not threaten to impair the national security.
Section 232 includes the authority to adopt and carry
out a plan of action, with adjustments over time, to
address the national security threat. That initial plan
of action may include negotiations of agreements with
foreign trading partners along with other measures to
adjust imports to address the national security threat.
If action under section 232 includes the negotiation of
an agreement, such as one contemplated in section
232(c)(3)(A)(i) (19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A)(i)), the
President may also take other actions he deems
necessary to adjust imports and eliminate the threat to
the national security, including if such an agreement
is not entered into within 180 days of the date of this
proclamation or is not being carried out or is
ineffective. See 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A).

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the
United States of America, by the authority vested in me
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,
including section 232, 19 U.S.C. 1862; and section 301
of title 3, United States Code, do hereby proclaim as
follows:

(1) The Secretary and the Trade Representative, and
any other senior executive branch officials they deem
appropriate, shall jointly pursue negotiation of
agreements, including those contemplated in section
232(c)(3)(A)(i) (19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(3)(A)(i)), to
address the threatened impairment of the national
security with respect to imports of PCMDPs from any
country. In negotiating, the Secretary and the Trade
Representative should consider price floors for trade
in critical minerals and other trade-restricting
measures. The Secretary and the Trade Representative,
in consultation with any other senior executive branch
officials they deem appropriate, shall, from time to
time, update me on the status or outcome of the
negotiations described in this proclamation. The
Secretary and the Trade Representative shall provide
one of these updates within 180 days of the date of
this proclamation.
(2) To the extent consistent with applicable law
and the purpose of this proclamation, the Secretary,
the Trade Representative, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security are directed and authorized to take all
actions that are appropriate to implement and
effectuate this proclamation and any actions
contemplated by this proclamation, including,
consistent with applicable law, the issuance of
regulations, rules, guidance, and procedures and

the temporary suspension or amendment of regulations,
within their respective jurisdictions, and to employ
all powers granted to the President under section 232,
as may be appropriate to implement and effectuate this
proclamation. The Secretary, the Trade Representative,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security may, consistent
with applicable law, including section 301 of title 3,
United States Code, redelegate any of these functions
within their respective executive departments or
agencies. All executive departments and agencies shall
take all appropriate measures to implement and
effectuate this proclamation.
(3) The Secretary shall continue to monitor imports
of PCMDPs. The Secretary also shall, from time to time,
in consultation with any senior executive branch
officials the Secretary deems appropriate, review the
status of such imports with respect to the national
security. The Secretary shall inform me of any
circumstances that, in the Secretary's opinion, might
indicate the need for further action by the President
under section 232.
(4) Any provision of previous proclamations and
Executive Orders that is inconsistent with the actions
taken in this proclamation is superseded to the extent
of such inconsistency. If any provision of this
proclamation or the application of any provision to any
individual or circumstance is held to be invalid, the
remainder of this proclamation and the application of
its provisions to any other individuals or
circumstances shall not be affected.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
fourteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord two
thousand twenty-six, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred and fiftieth.